News Release 338:
5 May 2000John Prescott welcomes publication of Gaul report: why was no search made for the wreck?
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott today announced the publication of a report into why no search was made for the wreck of the trawler Gaul in the years following its loss with all hands in February 1974.
The report, by Roger Clarke, was commissioned by Mr Prescott last year when he ordered the re-opening of the formal investigation into the loss of the Gaul following an underwater investigation of the wreck by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch in 1998.
Mr Clarke concludes that
in both the early years (1974-1976) and more recently (from the mid 1980s to 1997), uncertainty over where to look and concern over the extent and cost of a search were the primary reasons why no search was made for the trawler;
in the period 1977 and the years immediately following, when confidence in finding the trawler increased for a while, no search was made because of doubts that an underwater examination would lead to any worthwhile lessons for ship safety;
there is no evidence to suggest that security factors were involved in decisions not to search for the Gaul.
Commenting, Mr Prescott said:
"The Government welcomes Roger Clarke's clear, thorough and forthright account of why no search was made for the Gaul following her disappearance. I hope that it will answer many of the questions posed over many years by families of those who drowned. I am satisfied that the report portrays the truth.
"I asked Roger Clarke to report to me any lessons for investigating future accidents involving the disappearance of a vessel. His report contains twenty-one recommendations and the Government will implement all of them. I am determined to avoid any repetition of the unnecessary and prolonged uncertainty that has been suffered by bereaved Gaul families.
"This report closes the chapter on why no search was made for the Gaul and we must now leave it to the formal investigation to consider the circumstances of her sinking."
A second report, 'The search for bodies of the crew of the Gaul in Northern Russia', is also published today. This simply records the search for bodies and the results of the subsequent DNA test. As already announced, the bodies found in Russia proved not to be crew members of the Gaul.
Notes to editors
1. Roger Clarke was commissioned by John Prescott on 16 April 1999 to investigate why no search was made for the Gaul (Press Notice 409).
2. The Hull-registered motor trawler Gaul was lost off the North Cape on 8 February 1974. There was no distress message and all 36 crew members perished. The only wreckage recovered was a small buoy and the exact location of the wreck was not discovered.
3. A Formal Investigation was held during September and October 1974 into the loss of the vessel which concluded that the vessel capsized and foundered in heavy seas. However, the investigation found no direct evidence of how the tragedy occurred.
4. In August 1997, an expedition funded by UK and Norwegian television companies discovered the wreck of the Gaul. The documentary film of the expedition was shown on Channel 4 on 6 November 1997. Following this discovery, and on the recommendation of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch that a more detailed examination of the wreck would be necessary to determine the cause of the sinking of the vessel, the Deputy Prime Minister announced in January 1998 that the Government would undertake a new survey of the wreck. The survey was completed in August 1998. On the 15 August, the Deputy Prime Minister on the advice of the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents, Rear Admiral John Lang, that new and important evidence had been found, announced his intention to reopen the Formal Investigation into the sinking of the Gaul.
5. The formal investigation into the loss of the Gaul is expected to be reheard later this year.
6. Confirmation that the bodies found in Russia were not members of the Gaul crew was announced on 5 April 2000 (press notice 276).
7. The recommendations made by Roger Clarke in his report 'The Trawler Gaul: Why was no search made for the wreck' are attached in full below.
Recommendations contained in Roger Clarke's report: 'The Trawler Gaul: Why was no search made for the wreck?'
(i) Have we done all we reasonably can to ensure that vessels that sink so suddenly that they are unable to transmit an explicit distress message can nonetheless from now on be traced quickly and inexpensively?
a) Routine reporting by ships of their location
Fishing vessels:
R1 DETR should now follow up the 1998 consultative paper on Fishing vessel accidents and the recovery of those lost at sea by -
endorsing in principle the development of an effective location reporting system for UK fishing vessels;
remaining open at this stage to the option of an industry-run system, provided the industry show themselves prepared to establish and operate an effective system; and
opening discussions with fishing organisations and other interested parties to work out detailed proposals that will command as wide acceptance as possible.
Merchant vessels:
R2 When next the International Safety Management Code comes up for review in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UK should seek agreement on an amendment to make it clear that one feature of good safety management is for an owner (or whoever has assumed the responsibility for the operation of the ship from an owner) to monitor the location of their ships.
R3 In the meantime, in applying the Code in the UK the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) should interpret the Code as requiring a Safety Management System submitted for approval under it to cover satisfactory procedures for location reporting.
b) Carriage of equipment to alert the rescue and investigation services in the event of a sudden accident and fix its location
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)
R4 DETR should without further delay take a decision in the light of the views expressed in the 1998 consultative paper on the proposal for more vigorous enforcement of the requirement on fishing vessels to carry radio equipment, compatible with GMDSS, that is appropriate to the area where they are operating.
Electronic Position-Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs)
R5 The MCA should now publish a progress report on the taking forward of the various recommendations of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) on EPIRBs and generally on improving EPIRB effectiveness; the DETR should also announce decisions on the results of the 1998 consultation relevant to EPIRBs.
Satellite monitoring of European fishing vessels
R6 DETR, in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, should monitor operation of this system over the next two years with a view to assessing how far its potential contribution to fishing safety materialises and can be relied on for the future.
c) Carriage of equipment that will automatically help to locate a wreck and facilitate accident investigation.
Merchant vessels
R7 The UK's firm objective in current IMO discussions should be the fitting as soon as reasonably practicable of voyage data recorders (VDRs) to all commercial ships, except where they carry very small numbers of people (passengers or crew) and where the expense of installing a VDR would be material to the commercial viability of the enterprise. IMO should be urged to agree on mandatory fitment to all passenger vessels within the timetable proposed in 1999 by its Maritime Safety Committee and to all new cargo vessels.
Fishing vessels
R8 DETR should open consultations with the UK fishing industry on the cost implications of a requirement to carry VDRs, with a view to requiring their fitment at least to larger new vessels, those over 24 metres in length.
R9 This requirement should then be extended to other classes of fishing vessel once the condition of the industry and the unit price of the equipment and of its installation makes this feasible.
R10 Where the cost implications of fitting VDRs are prohibitive, DETR should discuss with the industry the alternative of a simple requirement for a locator beacon that, unlike an EPIRB, would remain attached to the hull under water.
(ii) Are we more ready now to examine a wreck underwater, where practicable, without prejudging the causes of the accident and the lessons it may have to teach us?
Willingness to examine wrecks under water
R11 MAIB, when considering in future whether to search for a missing vessel and to inspect it under water, should maintain their reluctance to believe that no safety lessons are likely to result; a search and underwater investigation should normally be undertaken whenever the Chief Inspector believes that the safety benefits are likely to justify the cost.
Costs and benefits
R12 DETR economists, drawing on the experience and advice of HSE, should consider with MAIB, MCA and other relevant officials whether a methodology could be devised that might assist decision-taking in the area of accident investigation.
Annual budget
R13 DETR should give fresh consideration to the funding of the MAIB's expenditure on underwater searches and surveys, taking into account the average annual expenditure incurred in earlier years, as is done for AAIB.
(iii) Have we now adequate access to modern equipment that would enable us expeditiously and economically to find and investigate an underwater wreck?
i. Equipment for locating a wreck
R14 DETR should now review the options for providing MAIB with the relevant equipment and decide how best and most cost-effectively to assure MAIB of the search facility they need when they need it.
ii. Equipment for examining a wreck under water
R15 DETR should evaluate alternative approaches for giving MAIB access to the appropriate equipment with a view to deciding as soon as possible which of them, or which combination of them, will provide MAIB with the most cost-effective means of reacting quickly to a requirement for an underwater survey.
R16 In the meantime, to cover their needs over the next three years, MAIB should explore with AAIB the practicality of entering into a short-term contract similar to theirs, perhaps covering initially both search and investigation.
(iv) In reacting to an accident like that of Gaul do we now give sufficient attention to the interests of the bereaved?
R17 In future, before any decision is taken not to search for a wreck or to investigate it when found, officials and ministers should explicitly take into consideration the wishes and interests of bereaved families and any danger that inaction will lead to their grief being aggravated by rumour and prolonged uncertainty.
R18 DETR should investigate ways of relieving some of the burden on MAIB inspectors in dealing sensitively with bereaved relatives at the same time as taking forward an urgent accident investigation.
R19 DETR should agree plans with the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents for dealing with large numbers of families in the event of a major marine disaster; these plans will need to take account of the contingency plans of vessel operators and the police for dealing with multiple casualties in the event of an accident to a passenger vessel.
(v) Can we improve our systems for the retention of records and their accessibility to make it less likely that failures of corporate memory like this will recur?
R20 In view of what happened over the Gaul, Ministry of Defence should review its policy over the destruction of files.
R21 DETR should now capitalise on the computerisation of its records and insure against a repetition of the Gaul errors by an appropriate programme of publicity and training.
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Published 5 May 2000
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